Centar za Bezbednosne Studije

 
In a statement given in the “new”, majority Serbian municipality of Klokot, in Kosovo, Ambassador Dell declared on 13 April 2010 that Kosovo is an independent state equal to Serbia and that the only way for Serbia to establish relations with Kosovo would be as two equal neighbours. He also said that the Belgrade authorities should give up illusions that a new negotiation might be possible either on Kosovo’s status, or on its borders and territory, adding that nobody in Belgrade should contemplate any division of Kosovo.

These same statements are regularly made by Kosovo Albanian intellectuals and politicians, and they are generally considered to be the reason why dialogue between Belgrade and Priština remains blocked. It appears clear that Mr. Dell supports this view and, while some credit should be given to the fact that he is, after all, an ambassador to Kosovo, and must to some extent tow the line of what is perceived to be Priština’s interests, his statement yesterday is both too strong and very unhelpful for the resolution of the current stalemate between Belgrade and Priština.

The infeasibility of Mr. Dell’s argument can be traced by simply following the consequences of the actions that would be required on Belgrade’s side in order to bring about the state of affairs that he refers to. According to him, the Belgrade government should recognize Kosovo in its current borders and proclaim it to be an “equal neighbour” of Serbia. Apart from violating the Serbian constitution, this would practically mean that the government would be immediately considered treasonous, and would either fall or be violently overthrown. As a consequence, Serbia would get a more right wing government. Its relations with the EU and its neighbours would deteriorate, and an implosion of the Serbian state would be set off: territorially, politically, and security-wise. In other words, Serbia would plunge the entire region into a new phase of instability, where American intervention would eventually be required in order to keep things from escalating to a pre-1995 state. Any volatility along the Serbian borders would be promptly used by the highly agitated regime amongst the Bosniak community in Sarajevo to instigate further tensions with Republika Srpska, thus adding another push to the conundrum of problems that would arise from a Kosovo recognition as it is.

The question that arises from this statement, assuming that it is the official position of the US Government, is what exactly the US Government envisages as a solution to the situation that would follow of Kosovo recognition in its present borders? One option would be to occupy the entire region and thus maintain a semblance of stability, but this is hardly realistic given the prohibitive financial and strategic cost involved in moving American soldiers from other theatres to the Balkans amid the economic crisis and the newly found spirit of restraint in Washington, exhibited by the Obama Administration. In other words, this option can hardly make it past the merely theoretical possibility.

Another option would be tolerate Serbia falling into internal disorder and a continued fission of its territory in the borderlands (Sandžak and Vojvodina, as well as the Albanian-populated South of Serbia come to mind). This, also, would be an untenable position for the US Government, because such fission would inevitably spill over to Bosnia and the neighbouring countries and would eventually necessitate the same level of commitment by the US as the first described option. Thus, this is also only a theoretical alternative.

The third and the only realistic interpretation is that Mr. Dell’s statement is designed to pressure the Serbian government to make up its mind quickly as to what it wants to achieve in Kosovo, and possibly make concrete demands in exchange for promising the recognition of a redefined Kosovo with reconfigured borders. If this is the aim of the statement, than it is in accordance with the announcements made early this year that the international community wishes to see “the final resolution of Kosovo status” in 2010. This creative interpretation would mean that at least part of what Mr. Dell appears to be ruling out might still be on the table, but for a short time. On the one hand, undoubtedly the positions of Washington vis-à-vis Kosovo must be taken into account very seriously. However, the logic of the situation on the ground dictates a compromise is indeed necessary with a view of regional stability.

Ambassador Dell’s statement, when looked into closely, consists of two separate statements. One is that no new status negotiations are forthcoming, and this is most likely correct, at least as long as the US considers the status final. The second statement is that apart from the status itself, the borders and territory are also not subject to any further negotiation, and it is this statement that one must take issue with. The view that no compromise is possible is too strong and, if accepted, would lead to a serious deterioration of the regional situation.

The only way in which the Serbian Government (any government) might be able to recognize Kosovo in the future is if it had enough to show for it to save face. There is nothing other that would allow such a move to be accepted other than part of Kosovo’s territory with a majority Serbian population, and adequate protections for the Serbian monasteries throughout Kosovo. That is the only logically possible diplomatic trade-off, and if it is indeed ruled out, as Mr. Dell suggests, than God knows what awaits us in the years to come. The frozen conflict between Serbia and such an artificially consolidated independent Kosovo, laden with deep-seated animosities, would most certainly not be a contribution to the region’s progress on its European path. In this context, neither Serbia, nor Kosovo (or Macedonia, for that matter), would be able to be admitted to the EU, and this part of the Western Balkans would remain a crisis spot.

The grim prospect of what one western Ambassador to Belgrade recently described as a cold war East-West Germany type of relationship between Belgrade and Priština can, however, be precluded by negotiations on what the second part of Mr. Dell’s statement appears to rule out.

It is this second half of Ambassador Dell’s statement that perhaps ought to be creatively interpreted or, if understood literally — disagreed with very strongly.

Aleksandar Fatić

Director of the Centre for Security Studies, Belgrade